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Abstract: 
Government student loan programs must balance the need to enforce repayment among 
borrowers who can afford to make their payments with some form of forgiveness or 
repayment assistance for those who cannot.  Using unique survey and administrative data 
from the Canada Student Loan Program, we show that nearly all recent borrowers with 
annual incomes above $40,000 make their standard loan payments while repayment 
problems are common among borrowers earning less than $20,000.  Still, over half of all 
low-income borrowers manage to make timely payments.  We demonstrate that other 
financial resources in the form of savings and family support are key to 
understanding this – repayment problems are rare among low-earners with access to 
savings and family support.  This has important policy implications, in part, because 
many recent proposals have advocated for a move to an income-based repayment system.  
Under such a system, many low-income borrowers in good-standing (due primarily to 
savings and family support) would pay less, while little new revenue would likely be 
generated from inducing payment among those that are currently delinquent or in default 
since their income levels are so low.  Specifically, we show that expanding Canada’s 
income-based Repayment Assistance Plan to automatically cover all borrowers could 
reduce revenue by nearly one-half over the first few years of repayment.  Although a 
sizeable group of recent borrowers would benefit from improved repayment 
assistance, our results suggest caution before broadly expanding assistance to all low-
income borrowers, many of whom already benefit from informal insurance provided by 
savings and their families. 
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1       Introduction 
Rising costs of higher education, student debt levels and student loan default rates have 
heightened tensions inherent in post-secondary student loan programs (Avery and Turner 2012).  
The central objective of these programs is to ensure that students have access to the funds needed 
to benefit from higher education.  However, with students borrowing more than ever and tight 
fiscal budgets, governments must ensure that loans are repaid whenever possible.  With three-
year student loan cohort default rates of nearly 15% (in both the U.S. and Canada), concerns 
naturally arise that some students may be choosing not to repay their loans even when they are in 
a position to do so.  At the same time, there are growing concerns that some low-income 
borrowers in delinquency or default may be financially unable to meet their loan obligations, 
prompting calls for expanding repayment assistance and income-based repayment schemes.1 A 
serious consideration of these issues requires a much better understanding of the relationship 
between student loan repayment and the financial resources of borrowers than is currently 
available.  In this paper, we use unique data on recent students to provide an up-to-date 
examination, documenting and exploring a number of relationships that have not been studied 
previously. 
By definition, a successful lending program should recover its outlays (with interest).  While 
some losses are to be expected from borrowers with few resources, those with adequate 
resources should meet their obligations.  Although labor market income is an important financial 
resource, access to other resources like personal savings, loans/gifts from families, or other in-
kind assistance from families (e.g., the opportunity to live at home) may also enable repayment.  
In determining whether borrowers are making appropriate payments, it is important to account 
for the full set of resources available to borrowers. 
Student loan repayment/non-payment rates by income, savings and family support are also of 
direct importance for thinking about the budgetary implications of potential changes in student 
loan programs like those currently being discussed.  For example, a shift toward more universal 
                                                          
1 The U.S. introduced the “Pay as you Earn” Repayment Plan for recent borrowers in 2012, while Canada introduced 
the Repayment Assistance Plan (discussed further below) in 2009-10.  More recently, a majority of the 15 proposals 
for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s effort to redesign the financial aid system in the U.S. (i.e., the 
Reimagining Aid Design and Delivery project) argue for a universal income-contingent repayment system.  See 
Nelson (2013) for a short summary of the proposals. 
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income-based (rather than debt-based) repayments would reduce payment amounts expected 
from those with low income levels.  This would have two important but opposing budgetary 
effects for student loan programs.  First, borrowers currently making standard payments would 
pay less, reducing program revenues.  Second, some borrowers that would otherwise stop 
making standard loan payments (i.e., those that are delinquent or in default under the current 
system) may be induced to make smaller income-based payments, thereby generating additional 
program revenue.  If many people with low personal income are currently taking advantage of 
other financial resources in order to repay their loans (as we show), then the first effect may 
dominate and a shift to an income-based repayment system could have a sizeable adverse impact 
on government budgets. Surprisingly, this possibility has been neglected in recent policy 
discussions. 
Despite the central importance of these relationships, little is known about the broad set of 
resources available to recent students and how those resources affect loan repayment. This is 
likely because previously used data sets do not contain information about student debt and 
repayment, post-school earnings, savings, and other (potential) family transfers. By combining 
administrative data on loan amounts and repayment with data from a survey we designed 
specifically to measure a broad array of available resources (i.e., income, savings, and family 
support), we provide new evidence on the link between these resources and student loan 
repayment.  Because our data also contain innovative questions soliciting borrower’s views on 
the importance of repaying student loans and the potential consequences of not doing so, we are 
able to account for heterogeneity in these factors when assessing the importance of income and 
other resources. 
The key to our analysis is the availability of unique data from the Canada Student Loans 
Program (CSLP).  The CSLP is natural for a study of this type, because the program is large in 
scope (servicing all provinces and territories in Canada except Quebec) and repayment problems 
are common.  In 2010-11, the CSLP provided loans to approximately 425,000 full-time students 
(Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2012).  The official three-year cohort default 
rate of 14.3% for loans with repayment periods beginning in 2008-09 was very similar to the 
corresponding rate of 13.4% for the U.S.  
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We augment administrative data detailing debt amounts and repayment outcomes with data from 
a survey – the Client Satisfaction Survey (CSS) – that we helped design to elicit information 
about potential determinants of repayment problems that are typically unobserved.  These data 
show that more than one-in-four CSLP borrowers in their first two years of repayment is 
experiencing some form of repayment problem at the time of the CSS.   
In Section 3, we show that repayment problems are strongly related to labor income with very 
low non-payment rates among higher income borrowers. Borrowers with income less than 
$20,000 are fourteen times more likely to experience some form of repayment problem than 
borrowers with income greater than $40,000.2  We estimate strong effects of income on 
repayment even after conditioning on debt levels, educational attainment, various demographic 
factors and beliefs about the importance of repaying student loans.  Using complementary data 
from the CSLP’s Defaulter Survey, we further show that defaulter’s are significantly more likely 
to return to good standing if they experience increases in earnings relative to when they entered 
default.  
Although nearly all repayment problems are concentrated in the low income group, many low 
income borrowers still manage to make timely CSLP payments.  In Section 4, we show that other 
forms of financial resources (i.e., savings or family assistance) are crucial for these low income 
borrowers.  Only 4% of low income borrowers with access to (at least) a modest amount of 
savings and family assistance experience repayment problems, while 60% of borrowers with 
negligible savings and little family support fail to make regular payments.  Together, these 
findings demonstrate that borrowers with the resources to pay their loans almost always do and 
that resources other than labor market income play an important role for many borrowers. 
The latter raises the possibility that policies based on the notion that labor income is a sufficient 
measure of the resources available for repayment may have unexpected budgetary consequences.  
In Section 5, we explore the implications of changing from the current CSLP environment, in 
which income-based payments are offered as one option to low income borrowers under the 
Repayment Assistance Program (RAP), to one in which all borrowers are automatically enrolled 
                                                          
2This relationship is stronger than that found in studies using earlier cohorts in the U.S. and Canada (Dynarski 1994, 
Flint 1997, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2004, 2013, Schwartz and Finnie 2002). See Gross, et al. (2009) for a 
recent survey of this literature.   
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in RAP.  In particular, we consider the effects of reducing payment levels to the income-based 
RAP amount for all low income borrowers whose standard (debt-based) payment would be 
higher.  Our finding that many low-income borrowers have access to other resources and 
continue to make standard loan payments suggests that losses from lowering their payments are 
likely to be substantial. Our finding that most borrowers in delinquency or default have low 
earnings suggests that any potential increase in revenues from inducing them to make smaller 
RAP payments is likely to be quite small.  Indeed, our calculations suggest that even if all 
borrowers in poor standing were induced to pay the RAP amount (an optimistic scenario), the 
policy of making RAP universal would lead to sizeable revenue losses for CSLP, at least in the 
short-run.3 
Altogether, our findings have important implications for the general design of student loan 
programs.  Measuring the availability of personal and family insurance for low-income 
borrowers is not only central to understanding the effects of income on repayment, but it also 
helps in assessing the need for additional insurance through explicit income-contingent 
repayment schemes.  Our results suggest that a sizeable group of recent borrowers would benefit 
from improved repayment assistance; however, our results also suggest caution before broadly 
extending that assistance to all low-income borrowers, since many of them benefit from informal 
insurance provided by their families or own savings.  
2       Data 
Our analysis involves merging CSLP administrative data with data from two CSLP surveys.  Our 
primary investigation uses data from the Client Satisfaction Survey (CSS), which is traditionally 
used to gauge borrowers’ general satisfaction with the CSLP program. For the years 2011 and 
2012, new survey questions were included on the survey in an effort to understand why some 
people experience repayment problems for their student loan obligations while others do not.  
                                                          
3 A pure accounting approach of the nature we consider likely under-states the costs of an income-contingent lending 
program, because it abstracts from any behavioral responses by (potential) borrowers related to moral hazard and 
adverse selection. For example, additional repayment assistance (or lower payments) for low-income borrowers may 
encourage students with weaker labor market prospects to borrow, adversely affecting the pool of borrowers (i.e., 
adverse selection).  It may also encourage borrowers to reduce study, job search, and work efforts or to choose less 
lucrative majors and careers (e.g., see the survey by Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011).  There is virtually no 
evidence on the likely importance of these effects; although Rothstein and Rouse (2011) provide some estimates of 
the effects of student loans on early career choices. 
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We also exploit data from the Student Loan Defaulter Survey (DS) for some of our analysis.  In 
early 2012, this survey was given to CSLP recipients who had entered default during the 
previous few years. 
2.1 Primary Sample from the 2011-12 Client Satisfaction Surveys 
The CSS is an annual telephone survey of roughly 2,700 borrowers of all ages (in-study and in-
repayment).4 The 2011 and 2012 surveys used in this study elicit unique information about 
background characteristics (e.g., gender, province of residence, education level, and field of 
study), financial resources (e.g., income, savings, and family/parental support), and perceptions 
about the consequences of not repaying loans. We match respondents from the CSS with their 
administrative records from the CSLP, which provide information regarding their loan balances 
and repayment outcomes (i.e., loan status) throughout the entire time they were clients. 
Administrative records also contain information on any repayment assistance programs the 
respondents may have benefited from, as well as information about respondents’ parental income 
levels (for dependent students).  
CSLP borrowers are not required to begin making payments on their loans until six months after 
they are last enrolled in school.  After this grace period, all CSLP loans are consolidated and 
repayment begins. We focus attention on the final loan repayment period, beginning six months 
after borrowers complete their most recent schooling spell. This avoids issues associated with 
school re-entry, since borrowers need not make payments on previous loans while enrolled.  
We restrict our sample to borrowers who entered their final loan repayment period no more than 
two years prior to the CSS.5  Borrowers in the early stages of repayment are of particular 
interest, because most repayment problems surface relatively quickly – roughly 80% of all CSLP 
                                                          
4 Survey response rates were 50% and 52%, respectively, in 2011 and 2012.  The survey administrator conducted an 
analysis of non-response to see whether responders and non-responders differed in the following dimensions 
relevant to our analysis: loan amount, repayment status (current, in arrears, on IR), institution type (private vs. 
public), province, and age.  Nearly all of these differences were statistically insignificant at the 5% level in both 
survey years; however, responders were 3-4 percentage points less likely to be in arrears in both surveys, suggesting 
that students having repayment problems are slightly under-represented. 
 
5 To determine the final repayment period, we examine their status as of two months after the CSS. Restricting the 
sample to those entering repayment within two years of the CSS also helps mitigate concerns about the sampling 
nature of the CSS, which did not survey borrowers who had fully repaid their loans nor those who were already in 
default (those in delinquency were surveyed).  We study the implications of this sampling scheme in Appendix A, 
and obtain very similar results to those presented in the paper when we limit our sample to those who had 
consolidated their loans within one year (rather than two years) of the CSS. 
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defaults occur within the first three years after consolidation with the majority coming in year 
three (Office of the Chief Actuary 2011).  We also restrict our sample to borrowers under age 30 
to ensure a more homogeneous group of respondents.  With these restrictions, our sample 
consists of 757 borrowers.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 1. Sample 
weights are used for all calculations (here and in following tables) to account for stratified 
sampling by province, loan type, and repayment status (within the CSS sampling frame).  
Repayment Outcomes 
Our analysis focuses on two measures of repayment problems at the time of the CSS.6  The first 
of our two dependent variables is a ‘serious repayment problem’ indicator which has a value of 
one if the CSLP administrative data indicates that the borrower is delinquent or has a loan status 
of bankruptcy, claim submitted, consumer proposal, return-to-government, aging default, or 
other defaults.7 The second dependent variable is an indicator for ‘any repayment problem’, 
which is set to one whenever a serious repayment problem exists or if an individual is taking 
advantage of repayment assistance offered by the CSLP: Interest Relief (IR), Debt Reduction in 
Repayment (DRR), or the Repayment Assistance Program (RAP).8 While borrowers on formal 
repayment assistance are generally considered to be in good standing, these outcomes are of 
interest because they are predictive of more serious longer term repayment problems like default 
(see Appendix B).  These programs are also costly even when borrowers do not ultimately 
default, since interest payments are often covered by CSLP and loan amounts may be forgiven.  
In 2010-11, nearly 90% of RAP recipients made no monthly payments, so CSLP covered 
associated interest payments at an estimated cost of $83 million (Human Resources and Skills 
                                                          
6 The 2011 and 2012 CSS surveys took place in January and February of both years.  We examine repayment status 
as of February 2011 and 2012. 
7 We observe a very small number of defaults in our sample, since the sampling frame (which excluded borrowers in 
default) was determined a couple months before the CSS was administered.  
8 Introduced in 2009, RAP reduces CSLP loan payments for eligible borrowers to ‘affordable’ amounts no greater 
than 20% of gross family income.  Eligibility is restricted to borrowers with low family income (adjusted by family 
size) relative to their standard loan repayment amount.  We discuss RAP further in Section 5.  Prior to RAP, the 
CSLP offered IR and DRR to eligible low-income borrowers.  The government made all interest payments for 
borrowers on IR while it paid down the principal (in multiple stages up to a maximum of $26,000) for borrowers on 
DRR who had exhausted their 54 months of eligibility on IR. 
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Development Canada 2011). Another $36 million was budgeted to cover future unpaid principal 
amounts associated with the RAP program for CSLP loans disbursed in 2010-11.   
Table 1 shows that 26% of borrowers had some form of repayment problem at the time of the 
CSS, while 11% were experiencing more serious repayment problems. 
Determinants of Repayment Problems 
A range of factors may influence student loan repayment.  Not surprisingly, previous studies 
have found student debt levels to be an important factor (e.g., see Gross, et al. 2009).  We 
measure the total CSLP loan amount outstanding at the beginning of the repayment period 
(summing across all loans) based on administrative data. Table 1 shows that, on average, CSLP 
borrowers owed nearly $14,000.  For information about other factors that may influence 
repayment behavior, we turn to the CSS.  In addition to basic demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, aboriginal status), we consider three broad categories of factors that may affect 
repayment: educational background, income and other financial resources, and beliefs about the 
importance of repaying student loans.  
As reported in Table 1, our sample contains more women than men and has an average age of 
twenty-four.  Aboriginals make up slightly less than 10% of our sample. Roughly 40% of 
borrowers were university graduates (from four-year institutions) or had a post-graduate degree, 
while 80% had a vocational/technical degree (from less than four-year institutions) or higher. 
Only 15% had attended a private institution, primarily at the vocational/technical level.  
With respect to financial resources, 85% earn less than $40,000 annually, while nearly half of all 
borrowers earn less than $20,000.  Given our sample restrictions (individuals under age 30 who 
recently left school), it is not surprising that respondents typically have few assets of their own – 
roughly half report less than $1,000 in savings.  Many respondents are also unable to count on 
their family for financial help. When asked how much their parents or other family would be 
willing to give them if they needed money over the next six months, 70% reported that they 
could obtain less than $2,500.  As emphasized by Kaplan (2012), many of our respondents may 
be able to move back home with their parents to help ends meet.  In our sample, 47% currently 
live with their parents while another 36% report that they could move back home if they needed 
to. 
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Finally, the CSS contains a unique survey question eliciting beliefs about the importance of 
repaying student loans.  Specifically, the survey asks borrowers which type of loan (e.g. CSLP, 
credit cards, home mortgage) they would repay first if financial difficulties prevented them from 
paying them all. Table 1 shows that roughly 40% of all respondents report that they would stop 
paying their CSLP loans first. This suggests that many individuals view that failure to make 
CSLP payments is less harmful than failing to repay other forms of debt.9  
2.2 2012 Defaulter Survey 
A total of 3,200 borrowers who had defaulted between Aug 1, 2009 and July 31, 2011 were 
interviewed in March 2012 for the Defaulter Survey. We analyze a subsample of 1,536 
respondents who allowed their survey information to be linked to their administrative records, 
were under age 30 (at the time of loan consolidation), and were surveyed within five years of 
consolidation.  To account for sample stratification by region and RAP experience, we use 
sampling weights provided by CSLP. 
Although everyone had defaulted prior to the survey, many borrowers had returned to good 
standing by the time of the survey.  The survey contains measures of income at the time of 
default and at the time of the survey – 84% had income of less than $1,600/month (roughly 
$20,000/year) at the time they entered default and 60% had income below this amount at the 
time of the survey.  Not surprisingly, these figures are worse than in the CSS.  Debt levels were 
also relatively high in the Defaulter Survey with 46% owing less than $10,000, 30% owing 
$10,000-20,000, and 24% owing more than $20,000.  The data contain the same measures of 
educational attainment as reported in the CSS: 48% had a vocational degree or more while 21% 
had a BA or higher.  Gender, age, and province of residence are also available. 
                                                          
9 The CSS also asks respondents what they think would happen to their credit rating if they did not repay their CSLP 
loans. We have created an indicator equal to one if they report that not paying would make borrowing much more 
difficult or impossible.  Using this indicator in place of the indicator variable based on which loan they would stop 
paying first yields very similar conclusions to those reported in the text. 
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3        Importance of Post-School Earnings for Loan Repayment 
3.1 Repayment Problems in the CSS 
Previous studies have demonstrated that educational attainment, student debt, and post-school 
income are all important determinants of student loan default.10  For comparison, we begin by 
examining the relationship between these factors and our measures of student loan repayment 
problems. 
Consistent with prior research, Table 2 shows that repayment problems are less common among 
borrowers with a four-year university degree relative to those with a two-year 
vocational/technical degree or less.  For example, serious repayment problems are 2.4 times as 
likely for borrowers with no post-secondary degree than for those with a university degree or 
higher (.16 vs. .07).11 Table 2 further shows that our broad measure of repayment problems (that 
includes individuals on repayment assistance) is increasing in student debt levels, while there is 
little systematic relationship between student debt and more serious repayment problems.   
The most striking finding in Table 2 and a primary focus of this paper is the strength of the 
relationship between repayment problems and post-school earnings.  Repayment problems are 
extremely rare among individuals with high earnings levels, while they are quite common for 
those with earnings levels below $20,000.  The existence of any repayment problem is roughly 
14 times as likely for borrowers earning less than $20,000 annually than for those earning more 
than $40,000 (.42 vs. .03).   Serious repayment problems are nearly 8 times as likely for 
borrowers earning less than $20,000 than those earning more than $40,000 (.17 vs. .02).  Both of 
these differences are statistically significant at all traditional levels.  Table 2 also shows that 
differences in repayment problems by income are large between low- and middle-income 
borrowers (i.e., annual income less than $20,000 vs. $20-40,000). 
The bivariate relationships reported in Table 2 are unlikely to entirely reflect causal effects for a 
number of reasons.  Most obviously, an attempt to establish causality should take into account 
                                                          
10 See Gross, et al. (2009) for a recent review of this literature. Most of this literature examines loan repayment and 
default in the U.S.; however, Schwartz and Finnie (2002) and Kapsalis (2006) study repayment and default in 
Canada. 
11 This difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but the difference between university degree and 
vocational/technical degree for the ‘serious repayment problem” is not. For ‘any repayment problem’, the difference 
between university degree and vocational/technical degree is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, while the 
difference between university degree and no degree is not (p-value =.11).   
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that educational attainment, debt levels, and post-school earnings are all strongly correlated.  For 
example, if higher earners tend to borrow more while in school, the effects of income on 
repayment problems may be overstated. Of perhaps greater concern is the possibility that 
traditionally unmeasured non-financial factors (correlated with observed factors like earnings) 
may also influence student loan repayment decisions. For example, students who have strong 
beliefs about the importance of honoring debts or have strong beliefs that non-payment will have  
substantial consequences may be more conscientious in other ways that may be rewarded in the 
labor market.  Fortunately, the CSS includes unique questions designed to measure these beliefs.  
An additional potential concern is that earnings levels only partially reflect an individual’s 
financial situation; however, they are likely to be correlated with other resources or forms of 
family support or ‘insurance’ that may also influence repayment behavior.  The role of non-
income financial resources is a central focus of this paper. We return to this issue in Section 4, 
exploring it in detail. 
In Table 3, we take advantage of the rich survey data from the CSS to incorporate a broader 
range of factors that may affect student loan repayment than has been considered in previous 
studies.  This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for a linear probability model 
using our two repayment problem measures as dependent variables.12  In addition to educational 
attainment, student debt, and post-school earnings, we control for a number of demographic 
characteristics, a measure of beliefs about the importance of repaying student loans, an indicator 
for whether the borrower had attended a private post-secondary institution, and province 
indicators.  Consistent with Table 2, the probability of any repayment problem is significantly 
increasing in student debt levels, while the likelihood of serious repayment problems is not.   
Based on the estimates in column 1, a borrower with $10,000 in loans is twelve percentage 
points less likely to have some form of repayment problem than a person with only $1,000 in 
loans. The effect of educational attainment is not statistically significant conditional on student 
debt and post-school income levels, but serious repayment problems are significantly more likely 
among borrowers who attended a private post-secondary institution.  
                                                          
12 Average marginal effects from an analogous Probit model are similar and available upon request. 
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There is some evidence that beliefs about the importance of repayment affect behavior.  Our 
estimates suggest that a borrower who “would stop paying the CSLP loan first if he was unable 
to repay all loans” is 7.9 percentage points (statistically significant at 0.10 level) more likely to 
experience some form of repayment problem than someone who would not stop paying the 
CSLP loan first. 
Our main focus is on the role of earnings.  The specifications in Table 3 include indicator 
variables for available annual income categories from the CSS.  Even after conditioning on 
student debt, educational attainment, and beliefs about repayment, we estimate strong effects of 
annual income on student loan repayment problems with a sizeable jump occurring around 
$20,000.  Borrowers earning less than $20,000 per year are 37-57 percentage points more likely 
to have some form of repayment problem than borrowers earning more than $40,000 (the 
omitted category).  The difference in serious repayment problems for these income groups is 
roughly 14 percentage points.13  These differentials are enormous given the rates of repayment 
problems (26% for any problem and 11% for serious problems) in our sample.   
3.2 Income & Returning to Good Standing – Evidence from the Defaulter Survey 
Although our regression includes potentially important factors unmeasured in previous studies, 
one might still worry that we have neglected other important determinants of repayment that may 
vary systematically across borrowers with different income levels.  If these unmeasured factors 
are largely time invariant, they could be differenced out using standard fixed effect approaches.  
Unfortunately, this type of within-person analysis is not possible using the CSS, because we only 
observe borrower income in a single period – at the time of the CSS.  Instead, we turn to the 
Defaulter Survey, DS.  While this survey also interviewed borrowers only once, it asked 
respondents about their earnings at two different points in time: (i) when they went into default 
(several months to a few years prior to the survey date) and (ii) at the time of the survey.  Our 
strategy is simple: examine the relationship between current earnings and current repayment 
status conditional on previous earnings and other measured factors (recall that all borrowers were 
initially in default).  If income truly impacts repayment status and is not simply correlated with 
other permanent unobserved factors that drive default, then borrowers with higher current 
                                                          
13 In Appendix Table B2, we estimate similar effects of income (at the time of CSS) on serious repayment problems 
up to 18 months after the CSS. 
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earnings should be more likely to have returned to good standing. In short, we examine how 
repayment reacts to a change in income after initially going into default. 
To study changes in repayment status in the DS, we limit the sample to the 1,536 individuals 
under age 30 who had left school and entered repayment within the past 5 years.  Panel A of 
Table 4 reports the fraction of respondents in the DS who are currently in good standing (at the 
survey date) conditional on their reported monthly income at the time they went into default and 
at the survey date.  Two patterns are immediately evident.  First, looking down either column, we 
observe that income at the time of default has little effect on current repayment status after taking 
current income into account.  Second and more important, looking across either row we see that 
defaulters currently earning more than $1,600/month (roughly $20,000/year) are 20-30 
percentage points more likely to have returned to good standing than defaulters earning less than 
$1,600/month.   
In Panel B of Table 4, we account for many of the same factors considered in Table 3 using 
multivariate regression.  In particular, we regress current default status on current monthly 
income and monthly income at the time the borrower went into default (both indicators for less 
than $1,600/month), as well as current CSLP loan amounts (indicators for zero, $1-5,000, 
$5,000-10,000, $10,000-15,000, $15,000-20,000, and $20,000-30,000), educational attainment 
(indicators for vocational degree and for university degree or higher), age, gender, and province 
indicators. Using sample averages for all non-income characteristics, Panel B reports predicted 
default rates from these regressions for all four combinations of low/high current monthly 
income and monthly income at the time the borrower entered default.14  Again, we see that 
current income has strong effects on current repayment status (those with income exceeding 
$1,600/month are 20-30 percentage points more likely to be in good standing than their lower 
income counterparts), while income at the time of default has much more modest implications 
for repayment status at the time of the survey. 
                                                          
14 Specifically, we calculate 𝑋�?̂? + 𝐷0,𝐶𝑆𝑆𝛾�0,𝐶𝑆𝑆 for each income combination, where 𝑋� reflects the sample average 
for all non-income variables, ?̂? reflects corresponding coefficient estimates, D0,CSS reflects indicator variables for 
low/high income at the time of default and at the time of the CSS, and 𝛾�0,𝐶𝑆𝑆 reflects coefficient estimates for the 
income indicators.  The table reports estimates for these predicted values along with standard errors for each 𝛾�0,𝐶𝑆𝑆. 
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4       Importance of Other Resources: Savings and Family Assistance 
Our results, thus far, establish borrower income as a central factor driving recent repayment 
behavior, with borrowers earning less than $20,000 annually experiencing significant repayment 
problems.  Still, Table 2 suggests that nearly 60% of these low-income borrowers manage to 
make timely CSLP payments.  Why do some low-income borrowers choose to make their loan 
payments (many who would qualify for RAP as we discuss in the next section), while others do 
not?   
Table 3 suggests that debt levels and a few other factors help explain these repayment 
differences, but these factors still leave the large majority of variation unexplained. In this 
section, we explore the extent to which other forms of personal and family resources affect 
student loan repayment behavior, especially among low-income borrowers.  
First, we try to capture family support using the traditional strategy of measuring parental 
income, which is only available for borrowers classified as dependent when they applied for 
financial aid—less than half our sample. The first two columns of Table 5 examine the extent to 
which parental income (for dependent students) can explain repayment behavior for borrowers 
with high and low income levels.  Column 3 shows results for independent students.  Consistent 
with our previous results, Table 5 indicates that that the borrower’s own income is quite 
important for repayment status regardless of dependency status and parental income. However, 
the table provides, at best, suggestive evidence that family support, as measured by parental 
income, might play an important role in mitigating the effects of low personal income.   Among 
borrowers with low earnings, those with parental income of less than $25,000 are 2.5 (1.3) times 
as likely as those with parental income greater than $25,000 to have a serious (any) repayment 
problem, but these estimated differences in repayment problems by parental income are not 
statistically significant.  
The lack of a firm finding in Table 5 may be partially due to the small sample sizes that remain 
after stratifying by both borrower and parental income. More importantly, however, parental 
income may be a poor proxy for post-school family support due to differences in actual 
willingness and/or ability to provide support to adult children.  This concern motivates our use of 
a more direct measure of family support based on a unique question from the CSS, which asks: 
“If you needed money during the next six months, how much would parents or other family be 
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willing and able to give you?”   We construct a “family assistance” indicator that equals one if 
the borrower reports that he/she could expect to receive $2,500 or more from family/parents – a 
modest sum but enough to cover up to a year of typical monthly loan payments.  Thirty percent 
of our sample expects this level of support, suggesting a potentially important role for parental 
transfers.15  
Borrowers may also have their own savings that they can draw on in the case of unemployment 
or other adverse labor market outcomes.  To explore the importance of this, we create an 
indicator variable that takes on a value of one for those who have at least $1,000 in savings – 
roughly half our sample.   
In Table 6, we examine the extent to which savings and family assistance help explain repayment 
behavior for borrowers with high and low income levels, analogous to that of Table 5.  Focus on 
results for low-income borrowers first.  Column 1 shows that low-income borrowers with access 
to both savings and family assistance are very unlikely to experience repayment problems.  Rates 
of any (serious) repayment problems are only 4% (1%) for these borrowers.  Column 2 shows 
that repayment problems become much more likely (rates of 26% for any problem and 8% for 
serious problems) for low-income borrowers with access to only one form of additional financial 
resources (i.e., some savings or family assistance but not both).  Column 3 shows that nearly 
60% (25%) of borrowers with negligible savings and little family support experience any 
(serious) repayment problems.  
Results for borrowers with incomes of at least $20,000 also suggest a role for savings and family 
assistance; however, the role is much more muted, especially for more serious repayment 
problems.  For these borrowers, access to at least one form of additional resources (savings or 
family support) appears to reduce the likelihood of repayment problems, but there is little 
marginal benefit from having access to both forms since repayment problems are already quite 
unlikely. 
                                                          
15 In Appendix C, we consider an alternative measure of family assistance that includes the ability of students to 
move back in with their parents.  Based on this broader measure of family assistance, approximately 86% of all 
borrowers can count on financial transfers of at least $2,500, can move back in with their parents, or already live 
with them.  Results using this alternative measure are qualitatively consistent with those discussed in the paper. 
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Table 6 suggests a very important role for additional financial resources.  Direct measures of 
these resources in the form of savings and potential family transfers reveals a much stronger role 
in affecting student loan repayment behavior than is suggested by measures based on 
dependency status and parental income levels.  We, therefore, use the more direct measures in 
the rest of our analysis. 16   
In Table 7, we estimate the importance of additional resources (i.e., savings and family 
assistance) for low-income borrowers (income less than $20,000/year) accounting for other 
possible determinants of repayment problems as studied previously in Table 3.  This helps 
address concerns that savings and family assistance may be correlated with the amount students 
borrow in the first place, the type of school they attend, their educational attainment, or their 
views about the importance of repayment.  Consistent with the results in Table 6, we estimate a 
very strong role for additional financial resources.  Relative to those with negligible savings and 
little parental help (the omitted category), low-income borrowers with either savings of at least 
$1,000 or access to family support of at least $2,500 (not both) are 36 percentage points less 
likely to experience any repayment problem and 14 percentage points less likely to experience a 
serious repayment problem.  Those with both savings and family support are 49 percentage 
points (20 percentage points) less likely to experience any (serious) repayment problem(s).  
To better understand the extent to which savings and family assistance serve as insurance 
mechanisms against adverse income shocks, Table 8 estimates specifications similar to Table 3 
after stratifying the sample based on access to these additional resources.  Differences in the 
effects of income across our three additional resource groups are striking.  Income has small and 
statistically insignificant effects on repayment problems for borrowers with access to both 
savings and family assistance.  By contrast, borrowers with neither savings nor family support 
are 61 percentage points (17 percentage points) more likely to experience any (serious) 
repayment problem(s) if their income is less than $20,000 relative to those with incomes above 
$40,000.  
                                                          
16 One might be concerned that our measures of savings and family assistance reflect differences in willingness to 
repay; however, we obtain similar effects of family resources and savings when controlling for self-reported views 
on the importance of CSLP repayment in Table 7.  We also obtain similar results for our low-income group when we 
restrict the sample to those with income of less than $10,000/year. These borrowers are very unlikely to be able to 
afford timely payments without some form of savings or outside assistance even if they have a strong desire to do 
so.  In this case, access to savings or parental support appears to make repayment feasible for many borrowers. 
 
17 
 
Altogether, these results suggest that savings and family assistance serve as very important 
sources of ‘insurance’ for borrowers in the event that they experience periods of low income or 
unemployment.  Borrowers with low income and no access to additional resources (from savings 
or family) are more likely than not to experience some form of repayment problem.  At the 
opposite extreme, high income borrowers with access to modest savings or family support are 
very unlikely to experience repayment problems, as are low-income borrowers with modest 
savings and family support.  Access to some form of financial resources – from work, savings, or 
family – is critical in determining which borrowers experience repayment difficulties.  Attempts 
to measure these additional resources using parental income as a proxy provide only a hint of the 
full extent of insurance provided by family transfers and savings.   
5      Implications for Repayment Assistance Programs 
Our results about the importance of savings and family support have direct implications for 
thinking about the design of government student loan programs.  An important feature of income 
contingent repayment schemes is to provide explicit insurance for borrowers when they 
experience adverse income shocks or unemployment.  This contrasts with the implicit insurance 
associated with delinquency and default, which typically trigger penalties like reporting to credit 
bureaus, legal proceedings, and sometimes wage garnishments.   
In both the U.S. and Canada, student loan borrowers can choose to enroll in income-contingent 
repayment programs if they are currently in good standing on their loan and can demonstrate 
financial hardship.  Under Canada’s RAP, eligible borrowers are expected to pay a fraction of 
their current income above a threshold – from zero to 20% based on their income – towards their 
CSLP loan.17  If this amount exceeds the standard debt-based payment amount, RAP recipients 
only need to pay the lesser amount.  Expected RAP payments are currently zero for single 
(childless) borrowers with monthly income below $1,685 (annual income of roughly $20,000).  
In 2010-11, nearly 90% of the 165,000 RAP recipients were not required to make a monthly 
payment (Office of the Chief Actuary 2011). 
                                                          
17 If the calculated payment is less than the interest accumulating on their debt that period, the federal government 
pays the remaining interest amount, so the principal does not grow.  Any loan balance remaining fifteen years after 
consolidation is effectively forgiven.  In the U.S., borrowers may choose Income-Based Repayment (IBR), Income-
Contingent Repayment (ICR), or the new “Pay as You Earn” Repayment plans, all linking payments to earnings for 
20-25 years. 
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One potential policy of interest would automatically enroll everyone in RAP, which would 
reduce enrolment costs associated with applying for and participating in RAP.  It would also 
alleviate concerns that some eligible borrowers are unaware of the option.  In principle, this 
policy would share key features of universal income contingent loan schemes that currently exist 
in countries like Australia or New Zealand (Chapman 2006). This policy is also broadly 
consistent with a variety of current proposals. For example, the state of Oregon is currently 
considering a universal income-contingent student loan program, while the majority of proposals 
for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations Reimagining Aid Design and Delivery project argue 
for a federal student loan system with income-based payments for all borrowers. 
In this section, we consider the potential short-run implications of such a policy for CSLP 
revenues (or payments by borrowers).  In particular, we examine how payments (based on 
income and debt levels as of the CSS) would change if all borrowers were automatically enrolled 
in RAP and made the expected payments under RAP (i.e., the lesser of the amount based on their 
income and the standard payment). 
Two groups of borrowers would be directly affected most by such a move.  First, many low-
income borrowers may see their payments lowered.  Under the current system, many of these 
borrowers make their standard payments even though they are eligible for much lower (or zero) 
payments under RAP.  This may reflect high costs associated with RAP enrollment, a lack of 
information about the program, or access to other resources like savings and family support that 
make lower payments unnecessary.  Second, many low-income borrowers that are currently 
delinquent or in default may choose to make a lower income-based payment.  The revenue 
implications of moving to a ‘Universal RAP’ program, therefore, depend on the balance of 
reduced payments from low-income borrowers currently making standard payments against the 
potential increased revenue from encouraging current delinquents/defaulters to make some 
(potentially small) payments.   
We use the administrative records combined with the CSS to measure these two revenue effects 
under a best case scenario for a ‘Universal RAP’.  In particular, we assume that no borrowers 
would fail to make their payments under the ‘Universal RAP’.  Thus, we assume that payments 
under ‘Universal RAP’ equal the lesser of the income-based RAP amount and the standard 
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payment, regardless of the borrower’s current repayment status. 18  In calculating payments under 
the ‘Current RAP’ regime, we use their standard payment as given by administrative records if 
they are currently in good standing, the RAP amount if they are currently on RAP, and zero if 
they are currently delinquent or in default.  
Figure 1 reports the distribution of payments under these two RAP regimes.  Interestingly, the 
fraction paying zero would nearly double under a ‘Universal RAP’ regime, since many low-
income borrowers currently in good standing would not be expected to make any payments 
under RAP.  This highlights the role of additional resources (i.e., savings and family support) in 
enabling repayment for many low-income borrowers.  Placing all of these borrowers on RAP 
automatically would significantly reduce their repayment obligations.  Our calculations further 
suggest that average monthly payments (including payments of zero) would decline by nearly 
half from $130 to $68 for recent school-leavers if RAP were made universal.  A decline in 
revenue of this magnitude is likely to threaten the sustainability of CSLP.   
It is important to note that these calculations are rough and only meant to illustrate the potential 
implications of broadening the RAP base and to highlight the importance of borrower income 
and other resources for student loan repayment.  It is possible that some borrowers would 
continue to make higher payments than expected by RAP if automatically enrolled.  At the same 
time, many currently delinquent borrowers may continue to remain delinquent; although, the 
implications of this are likely to be modest given that expected RAP payments for many of these 
borrowers are very low or zero given their incomes.  Most importantly, these calculations do not 
factor in any dynamic effects a move to ‘Universal RAP’ might entail.  If the program keeps 
borrowers better connected with CSLP, it may ultimately result in higher total lifetime payments 
among borrowers who temporarily experience poor labor market outcomes.  Even in this case, 
however, government interest payments for many RAP recipients are likely to be substantial.  A 
detailed accounting of these effects is beyond the scope of this paper and would require better 
                                                          
18 To simplify the calculation of expected payments under RAP, we focus on single borrowers with no children (the 
majority our sample), since the threshold income level above which RAP payments begin depends on household 
size.  This analysis excludes 3% of our sample that is from Manitoba, PEI or Yukon, since income-contingent RAP 
payments in these provinces also depended on loan amounts.  RAP income-based payments were calculated based 
on the mid-points of reported monthly income categories in the CSS (0, 1-$799, $800-1599, $1600-2499, $2500-
3299, $3300-4999, $5000-6699, and $6700+). The standard monthly payment amount is reported in administrative 
records.  
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longitudinal data.19  Nonetheless, our findings provide strong evidence that caution is warranted 
when considering these types of changes to repayment programs. 
6      Conclusions 
For recent Canadian students, post-school income has strong effects on student loan repayment.  
Borrowers earning more than $40,000 per year have non-payment rates of 2-3 percent, while 
borrowers with annual income of less than $20,000 are more than ten times as likely to 
experience some form of repayment problem.  On the one hand, the very low non-payment rates 
among borrowers with high earnings suggest that student loan repayment is well-enforced in 
Canada.  On the other hand, high delinquency and default rates among low-income borrowers 
signal important gaps in more formal insurance mechanisms like RAP.  These gaps have 
motivated growing interest in the expansion of income-contingent repayment schemes for 
student loans in both Canada and the U.S.  
Despite relatively high non-payment rates for low-income borrowers, the simple fact is that more 
than half of them continue to make their standard student loan payments.  We show that other 
financial resources in the form of personal savings and family support are crucial to 
understanding why/how so many borrowers with very low income still manage to pay off their 
loans.  Low-income borrowers with negligible savings and little or no family support are more 
likely than not (59%) to experience some form of repayment problem, while fewer than 5% of 
low-income borrowers with both savings and family support do.  Consistent with larger 
literatures in economics emphasizing the roles of savings and family transfers as important 
insurance mechanisms (e.g., Carroll 1997, Becker 1991), we estimate that borrower income has 
small and statistically insignificant effects on the likelihood of repayment problems for those 
with modest savings and access to family assistance.  By contrast, among borrowers with 
negligible savings and little or no family assistance, the effects of income on repayment are 
extremely strong.  We also show that measures of parental income when students first borrow 
(available in some administrative loan datasets) are a relatively poor proxy for these other forms 
                                                          
19 We also abstract from potential behavioral changes that might affect borrower income levels due to moral hazard 
or adverse selection (e.g. reduced effort during or after school).  These effects would likely increase the costs of 
moving to a ‘Universal RAP’ system. 
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of self- and family-insurance, which suggests that efforts to accurately measure savings and 
potential family transfers offer real benefits. 
These findings have important implications for efforts to expand income-contingent repayment 
schemes that are under current discussion.  We show that expanding the income-based 
repayment RAP to automatically cover all borrowers would reduce revenues by roughly half for 
borrowers early in their repayment period.  This is because a more universal income-based 
repayment scheme would significantly reduce repayment levels for many low-income borrowers 
who currently make their standard payments.  At the same time, little revenue would be raised 
from inducing borrowers currently in delinquency/default to make income-based payments, since 
the vast majority of these borrowers have very low income levels.   
Altogether, we find that slightly more than half of all low-income borrowers have little self- or 
family-insurance.  These borrowers currently have high delinquency/default rates and would 
surely benefit from greater government insurance (i.e., some form of repayment assistance).  Yet, 
our results also suggest considerable caution is warranted before broadly expanding income-
contingent repayment schemes.  Many low-income borrowers have access to savings and family 
support that enables them to make standard payments.  Lowering payments for these borrowers 
based on their incomes alone would significantly reduce student loan program revenues to the 
point of threatening their viability.   
Our results suggest that the optimal design of student loan repayment schemes is more 
complicated than recent proposals and studies would suggest.  Contrary to current thinking, the 
family plays an integral role in student loan repayment.  This neglect is, perhaps, surprising 
given the established literature on family transfers and the central role parental resources play in 
determining financial aid at the college-going stage.20  Our results raise important questions 
about the extent to which government repayment assistance should depend on broader family 
resources and transfers (to the extent possible), since these clearly influence repayment behavior.  
They may also help in understanding puzzling differences in default rates by race in the U.S. – 
                                                          
20 Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) provide early treatments of intra-family 
transfers.  Brown, et al. (2006) provide an interesting recent analysis that explicitly links transfers to educational 
choices.  Evidence on the nature and extent of parental transfers to adult children is provided in Cox (1987), 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Gale and Scholz (1994), McGarry and Schoeni (1995), Altonji, et al. (1997), and 
Haider and McGarry (2012). 
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blacks have much higher default rates than whites even when debt levels and post-school income 
are held constant (e.g. see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2013). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Payments under Current RAP and 'Universal RAP' 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Error
A. Repayment Outcomes as of CSS (N=757)
any repayment problem (default+banktrupcy+delinquency+IR+DRR+RAP) 0.262 0.024
serious repayment problem or delinquent (default+banktrupcy+delinquency) 0.107 0.015
B. Potential Repayment Determinants (N=757)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 1.367 0.065
current month's income less than $20,000/yr 0.489 0.032
current month's income $20,000/yr to less than $40,000/yr 0.358 0.030
vocational/technical school graduate or more 0.795 0.027
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree 0.408 0.031
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.409 0.031
male 0.425 0.031
age 23.710 0.183
aboriginal 0.094 0.019
private for-profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.150 0.014
C. Parental Help and Savings Variables (N=689)
expected parental transfer less than $2500 0.701 0.031
savings less than $1,000 0.486 0.033
D. Dependency Status (N=757) and Observed Family Income (N=259)
dependent student 0.388 0.031
parental income in $1,000 (dependents only) 46.087 3.110
parental income less than $25,000 (dependents only) 0.301 0.046
Notes:  Sample weights used in calculating all statistics.
Table 2: Repayment Problems at CSS by Income, CSLP Debt, and Education
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
A. by current monthly income
   less than $20,000 0.423 0.040 0.174 0.026
   $20,000 to less than $40,000 0.148 0.030 0.045 0.012
   at least $40,000 0.030 0.016 0.022 0.015
B. by CSLP loan amount at consolidation
   less than $10,000 0.202 0.028 0.117 0.021
   $10,000 to less than $20,000 0.294 0.047 0.084 0.021
   $20,000 to less than $30,000 0.365 0.068 0.094 0.032
   at least $30,000 0.377 0.073 0.115 0.046
C. by highest educational attainment
   no post-secondary degree 0.309 0.054 0.157 0.034
   vocational/technical degree or higher 0.312 0.038 0.118 0.024
   4-year university graduate or higher 0.209 0.031 0.066 0.016
Notes:  Sample weights used in calculating all statistics.
Any Repayment 
Problem
Serious Repayment 
Problem
Table 3: OLS Estimates for Probability of Repayment Problems
Variables
Any 
Repayment 
Problem
Serious 
Repayment 
Problem
current income: none 0.574 0.145
(0.088) (0.053)
current income: $1 to less than $10,000/year 0.447 0.142
(0.082) (0.061)
current income: $10,000/year to less than $20,000/year 0.373 0.140
(0.064) (0.043)
current income: $20,000/year to less than $30,000/year 0.146 -0.005
(0.050) (0.024)
current income: $30,000/year to less than $40,000/year 0.100 0.005
(0.055) (0.033)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 0.131 0.045
(0.044) (0.030)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared -0.010 -0.007
(0.008) (0.005)
vocational/technical school graduate or more -0.010 -0.065
(0.068) (0.050)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree -0.075 -0.008
(0.060) (0.032)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.079 0.002
(0.047) (0.027)
male 0.013 -0.025
(0.047) (0.028)
age 0.015 0.003
(0.010) (0.007)
aboriginal 0.040 0.038
(0.090) (0.048)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.080 0.089
(0.050) (0.039)
Observations 757 757
R-squared 0.239 0.088
Notes: Linear probability model estimated using OLS.  Specifications also include indicators 
for  CSS cohort and province.  Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.
Table 4: Fraction of Defaulters Returning to Good Standing by Income at Default and Survey Dates
Less than $1,600 At Least $1,600
A. Raw means
   Monthly Income at Default Date less than $1,600 0.161 0.369
(0.019) (0.034)
   Monthly Income at Default Date at Least $1,600 0.150 0.452
(0.068) (0.052)
B. Regression adjusted
   Monthly Income at Default Date less than $1,600 0.160 0.365
(0.084) (0.088)
   Monthly Income at Default Date at Least $1,600 0.184 0.458
(0.113) (0.094)
Monthly Income at Survey Date:
Note: Panel A reports percentage of defaulters that paid off their loans entirely or are currently in good 
standing at the time of the Defaulter Survey by monthly income at the time of default and at the time of 
the survey. Panel B reports the predicted fraction in good standing at the time of the Defaulter Survey by 
income at the time of default and at the time of the survey holding other characteristics fixed at their 
sample averages. Predictions are based on an OLS regression controlling for current CSLP debt amount 
(indicators for zero, $1-5,000, $5,000-10,000, $10,000-15,000, $15,000-20,000, and $20,000-30,000), 
educational attainment (indicators for vocational/technical degree and for BA or higher), age, province of 
residence, and gender. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sampling weights are used.  Sample size is 
1,536.
Table 5: Repayment Problems at CSS by Borrower and Parental Income
Parental Income         
≥ $25,000
Parental Income 
< $25,000
Independent 
Students
A: Any Repayment Problem
Borrower Income < $20,000 0.413 0.547 0.378
(0.092) (0.137) (0.051)
10.98% 5.38% 32.13%
Borrower Income ≥ $20,000 0.095 0.066 0.139
(0.035) (0.028) (0.036)
17.31% 6.38% 27.51%
B: Serious Repayment Problem
Borrower Income < $20,000 0.099 0.247 0.166
(0.038) (0.101) (0.034)
10.98% 5.38% 32.13%
Borrower Income ≥ $20,000 0.023 0.046 0.050
(0.019) (0.023) (0.014)
17.31% 6.38% 27.51%
Note: Parental income (columns 1 and 2) is only observed for dependent students.  Independent 
status is based on first year in CSLP records.  Standard errors are in parentheses. (Weighted) 
percent of population in each cell is in italics. Sampling weights are used.
Table 6: Repayment Problems at CSS by Income and Additional Financial Resources
Has Both Savings  
and Family 
Assistance
 Has Either Savings or 
Family Assistance         
(Not Both)
Has Neither 
Savings nor Family 
Assistance
A: Any Repayment Problem
Income < $20,000 0.037 0.263 0.585
(0.020) (0.067) (0.060)
6.64% 15.08% 26.70%
Income ≥ $20,000 0.045 0.072 0.307
(0.024) (0.023) (0.079)
11.94% 29.01% 10.60%
B: Serious Repayment Problem
Income < $20,000 0.011 0.075 0.250
(0.009) (0.030) (0.044)
6.64% 15.08% 26.70%
Income ≥ $20,000 0.024 0.026 0.100
(0.020) (0.013) (0.029)
11.94% 29.01% 10.60%
Note: 'Savings' implies savings of at least $1,000.  'Family Assistance' implies expected family 
transfers of at least $2,500.  Standard errors are in parentheses. (Weighted) percent of population 
in each cell is in italics. Sampling weights are used.
Table 7: The Effect of Savings and Parental Transfers on Repayment Problems for Low-Income Borrowers
Variables
Any Repayment 
Problem
Serious 
Repayment 
Problem
has either savings or parental help (not both) -0.358 -0.138
(0.077) (0.056)
has both savings and parental help -0.491 -0.201
(0.087) (0.060)
current annual income < $10,000 0.150 0.000
(0.073) (0.056)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 0.239 0.102
(0.078) (0.062)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared -0.023 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012)
vocational/technical school graduate or more -0.019 -0.075
(0.091) (0.078)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree 0.164 0.000
(0.096) (0.057)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.079 -0.064
(0.072) (0.047)
male -0.003 -0.079
(0.077) (0.051)
age 0.003 0.002
(0.019) (0.016)
aboriginal 0.006 0.134
(0.144) (0.116)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.082 0.039
(0.078) (0.074)
constant 0.328 0.195
(0.422) (0.374)
Observations 356 356
R-squared 0.368 0.149
Note:  Sample includes respondents with income less than $20,000 per year. 'Savings' implies savings of 
at least $1,000.  'Family Assistance' implies expected family transfers of at least $2,500.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. Sampling weights are used.
Table 8: Effects of Income and Other Characteristics on Repayment Problems for Different Levels of Additional Resources
Variables
Has Both 
Savings  and 
Family 
Assistance
 Has Either 
Savings or 
Family 
Assistance 
(Not Both)
Has Neither 
Savings nor 
Family 
Assistance
Has Both 
Savings  and 
Family 
Assistance
 Has Either 
Savings or 
Family 
Assistance 
(Not Both)
Has Neither 
Savings nor 
Family 
Assistance
current monthly income < $20,000/yr -0.032 0.376 0.615 -0.101 0.121 0.166
(0.122) (0.090) (0.111) (0.103) (0.049) (0.091)
current monthly income $20,000 to at least 40,000/yr -0.095 0.187 0.262 -0.119 0.068 0.013
(0.118) (0.061) (0.119) (0.105) (0.033) (0.082)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) -0.035 0.076 0.232 -0.057 0.032 0.115
(0.048) (0.049) (0.102) (0.036) (0.023) (0.080)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared 0.015 -0.004 -0.029 0.013 -0.005 -0.018
(0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013)
vocational/technical school graduate or more -0.015 -0.029 -0.009 -0.025 -0.087 -0.025
(0.038) (0.099) (0.120) (0.026) (0.048) (0.103)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree 0.052 0.020 -0.072 -0.015 0.043 -0.053
(0.064) (0.076) (0.116) (0.036) (0.027) (0.075)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.039 0.108 0.059 0.030 0.053 -0.078
(0.043) (0.064) (0.094) (0.030) (0.037) (0.064)
male -0.001 0.092 0.036 -0.058 0.013 -0.053
(0.061) (0.064) (0.102) (0.041) (0.028) (0.068)
age 0.007 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.011 -0.010
(0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015)
aboriginal -0.017 -0.145 0.083 0.026 -0.072 0.020
(0.087) (0.068) (0.141) (0.080) (0.045) (0.086)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.149 0.112 0.010 0.125 0.133 0.063
(0.102) (0.064) (0.093) (0.077) (0.060) (0.069)
Constant -0.199 -0.651 -0.557 -0.246 -0.313 0.255
(0.211) (0.284) (0.530) (0.184) (0.175) (0.385)
Observations 101 240 348 101 240 348
R-squared 0.165 0.227 0.169 0.171 0.123 0.096
Any Repayment Problem Serious Repayment Problem
Notes: 'Savings' implies savings ≥ $1,000.  'Family Assistance' implies expected family transfers ≥ $2,500. Standard errors are in parantheses. Sampling 
weights are used. 
 Appendix A      Default and Full Repayment Following Consolidation 
In this appendix, we consider the implications of the CSS sampling scheme, which did not 
include borrowers who had fully repaid their loans or had defaulted as of the date the samples 
were drawn (a few months before each CSS).  This may raise some concerns if a sizeable 
fraction of the sample is systematically excluded.   
We first examine when borrowers first enter default or repay their loans in full relative to the 
date of consolidation.  To do this, we use the 2010 and 2011 CSS, since we have follow-up 
administrative loan records for these individuals that continue for a few years.  To ensure that we 
do not lose any borrowers due to full repayment or default, we consider a sample consisting only 
of borrowers who had not yet consolidated their loans at the time of the CSS.  Specifically, we 
limit our sample to those who consolidated their loans from the month of the CSS up to nine 
months after the CSS.  In Figure A1, we include those borrowers who we observe for at least 12 
months after consolidation, while Figure A2 includes a more limited sample of borrowers who 
we observe for at least 24 months after consolidation.  Both figures report the fraction of 
borrowers that had entered default or fully repaid their loans by months since consolidation.  
Figure A1 includes 248 borrowers, while Figure A2 includes 115 borrowers.  
Not surprisingly, we observe no defaults until month 11.  Borrowers are not considered in default 
until they have missed nine consecutive payments, and the timing is such that this does not get 
recorded as a default until month 11 in our data.  Figures A1 and A2 suggest that about 5% of 
borrowers never make any initial payments and enter default as early as possible.  Over the next 
few years, another 3-4% enter default.  In the paper, we include individuals who were 
administered the CSS within the first 24 months after consolidation.  Averaging across all 
potential months, our sample excludes less than 5% of the population who would have been in 
default at the time the sample was drawn.  Limiting the sample to those administered the CSS 
within the first twelve months after consolidation would exclude a negligible population in 
default. (Indeed, since the samples were drawn 2-3 months prior to the CSS, we are unlikely to 
be missing anyone due to default when limiting our sample to those taking the CSS within 12 
months of consolidation.) 
Figures A1 and A2 suggest that our samples are more likely to exclude borrowers who fully 
repaid their loans, since 3-4% repay their loans prior to or at the time of consolidation, while 
another 10% repays their loans over the course of the first year after consolidation.  Averaging 
across all potential months within the first 24 months after consolidation suggests that our main 
sample is missing slightly more than 10% of the population who had fully repaid their loans.  
Limiting our sample to those taking the CSS within the first year after consolidation would 
reduce this exclusion to a little under 10%.   
 Altogether, our main sample is missing roughly 5% of the population who defaulted fairly 
quickly and another 10-15% who paid off their loans quickly. By limiting the sample to those 
administered the CSS within one year of consolidation, we would no longer miss anyone who 
defaulted and would miss around 7-8% of those who fully repaid their loans shortly after leaving 
school.  Most of the full repayment exclusions would be due to borrowers who fully repaid their 
loans before any payments were actually due.  In this case, we could simply re-interpret our 
results to apply to borrowers who do not fully repay their loans immediately after leaving school.   
To see whether these omissions affect our results, Table A1 reports results analogous to those of 
Table 3 in the paper using the more restricted set of borrowers who consolidated their loans no 
more than one year (rather than two years as in the paper) prior to the CSS.  While the results are 
less precise due to the smaller sample, the estimated coefficients are quite similar to those 
reported in Table 3.  These results suggest that the (odd) sampling scheme of the CSS does not 
have important implications for our main results. 
Appendix B      Repayment Problems 12 and 18 Months after CSS 
Updated designation files for the 2010 and 2011 CSS respondents allow us to observe outcomes 
twelve and eighteen months after the survey dates. Examining how the status of respondents 
changes during this period provides information about whether particular repayment problems 
tend to be especially persistent or tend to be good predictors of other (more serious) repayment 
problems in the future. 
Appendix Table B1 reports the probabilities of different types of repayment problems 12 and 18 
months after the 2010 and 2011 CSS. Among those who had any form of repayment problem at 
the CSS, one-in-three had a serious repayment problem (delinquency or default/bankruptcy) 12 
and 18 months later, compared to about 5% of those with no problems as of the CSS. Thus, 
repayment problems were evident early and were quite persistent. Breaking the sample up by 
different types of repayment problems at CSS, 13% of those who were on IR/DRR or RAP at the 
CSS had a serious repayment problem 12 and 18 months later, while over half of those already in 
delinquency at CSS had a serious repayment problem a year or more later. IR/DRR/RAP 
recipients as of the CSS were also much less likely to be in default or have declared bankruptcy 
12 and 18 months later when compared with those in delinquency at CSS (less than 2% vs. 27-
35%). While IR/DRR and RAP may help borrowers continue on a path to eventual payment, 
these differences need to be interpreted with caution. First, individuals must go through a lengthy 
period of delinquency before they are considered in default, so many respondents on IR/RAP at 
the CSS date may not have had time to go through delinquency long enough to get to default 12-
18 months after the CSS. Second, those on IR/DRR/RAP may be in a better position (i.e., lower 
debt, higher income) to repay their loans, on average. Related, those choosing to sign up for 
IR/RAP may have a strong desire to repay their loans relative to those who go straight to 
delinquency. 
  In Appendix Table B2, we show that income (at CSS), debt, and educational attainment are still 
important determinants of repayment problems 12 and 18 months after CSS. The effects of these 
variables are quite similar to their counterparts reported in column 2 of Table 3, which considers 
the determinants of serious repayment problems at the time of the CSS. Interestingly, enrolment 
in private institutions has a much stronger effect on serious repayment problems 12 and 18 
months after CSS than it does at CSS. It is likely that enrolment in these institutions is associated 
with lower long-term income levels. At CSS, this is accounted for by including a measure of 
current income; however, we do not have an income measure 12-18 months after CSS.  More 
importantly, however, these results highlight the importance of many of the same factors that 
impacted repayment at CSS. 
Appendix C      Living with Family as a Form of Family Assistance 
Recent research in other contexts (e.g. Kaplan 2012) has recognized that financial assistance 
from families often comes in the form of housing. To account for this, we modify our measure of 
family assistance to incorporate this possibility.  For Appendix Tables C1-C3 (analogous to 
Tables 6-8 in the paper), we set the family assistance indicator to one if any of the following are 
true: (1) the respondent could expect to receive $2,500 or more from family/parents in the next 
six months if needed, (2) the respondent could move in with family if necessary, or (3) the 
respondent already lives with their parents.  The results in Tables C1-C3 strongly support the 
conclusion that savings and family assistance are critical forms of insurance for low-income 
borrowers, significantly reducing the likelihood of repayment problems. 
  
  
Figure A1: Default and Full Repayment by Months Since Consolidation 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Default and Full Repayment by Months Since Consolidation 
 
Table A1: OLS Estimates for Probability of Repayment Problems (CSS within 1 Year of Consolidation)
Variables
Any Repayment 
Problem
Serious 
Repayment 
Problem
current income: none 0.547 0.098
(0.109) (0.061)
current income: $1 to less than $10,000/year 0.424 0.135
(0.105) (0.078)
current income: $10,000/year to less than $20,000/year 0.477 0.215
(0.098) (0.066)
current income: $20,000/year to less than $30,000/year 0.230 0.002
(0.085) (0.046)
current income: $30,000/year to less than $40,000/year 0.143 0.017
(0.087) (0.063)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 0.161 0.048
(0.052) (0.036)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared -0.012 -0.007
(0.009) (0.007)
vocational/technical school graduate or more 0.043 -0.070
(0.085) (0.066)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree -0.129 0.007
(0.082) (0.046)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.104 0.007
(0.062) (0.038)
male 0.000 -0.014
(0.065) (0.041)
age 0.017 0.004
(0.012) (0.009)
aboriginal 0.113 0.105
(0.124) (0.075)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.077 0.096
(0.064) (0.059)
Observations 465 465
R-squared 0.269 0.109
Notes: Linear probability model estimated using OLS.  Specifications also include indicators for  CSS cohort 
and province.  Sample only includes respondents taking the CSS within one year of CSLP consolidation.  
Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B1: Probability of Repayment Problems 12 and 18 Months after CSS by Repayment Status at CSS
(2010 and 2011 CSS)
Status at CSS Delinquency
Default or 
Bankruptcy Delinquency
Default or 
Bankruptcy
No Problem (N=464) 0.035 0.005 0.035 0.019
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
IR/DRR/RAP (N=212) 0.129 0.004 0.114 0.019
(0.033) (0.002) (0.031) (0.010)
Delinquency (N=165) 0.262 0.274 0.213 0.345
(0.071) (0.055) (0.066) (0.064)
Any Problem (N=377) 0.183 0.148 0.155 0.185
(0.036) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031)
All (N=863) 0.076 0.045 0.068 0.065
(0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Status 12 Months after CSS Status 18 Months after CSS 
Notes: Analysis uses extended designation files for 2010 and 2011 CSS samples. 'Any problem' indicates 
being either in IR, DRR, RAP, delinquency or default/bankruptcy. Sampling weights are used.
Table B2: OLS Estimates for Probability of Repayment Problems 12 and 18 months after CSS (2010 and 2011 CSS)
Variables
Serious 
Repayment 
Problem
Default or 
Banktrupcy
Serious 
Repayment 
Problem
Default or 
Banktrupcy
current income: none 0.192 0.165 0.102 0.065
(0.065) (0.070) (0.040) (0.055)
current income: $1 to less than $10,000/year 0.089 0.098 0.076 0.076
(0.054) (0.069) (0.043) (0.065)
current income: $10,000/year to less than $20,000/year 0.105 0.075 0.046 0.037
(0.044) (0.059) (0.025) (0.051)
current income: $20,000/year to less than $30,000/year 0.019 0.013 -0.015 -0.029
(0.038) (0.050) (0.019) (0.042)
current income: $30,000/year to less than $40,000/year -0.040 -0.066 -0.024 -0.059
(0.034) (0.045) (0.017) (0.038)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 0.061 0.061 0.027 0.015
(0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.025)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared -0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
vocational/technical school graduate or more -0.055 -0.040 -0.026 -0.051
(0.053) (0.057) (0.036) (0.047)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree -0.083 -0.074 -0.050 -0.068
(0.033) (0.032) (0.020) (0.024)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.076 0.015 0.027 0.008
(0.030) (0.031) (0.020) (0.025)
male -0.022 -0.025 -0.013 -0.013
(0.026) (0.030) (0.018) (0.024)
age -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
aboriginal 0.076 0.162 0.092 0.069
(0.059) (0.070) (0.049) (0.053)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.171 0.167 0.082 0.102
(0.049) (0.053) (0.032) (0.046)
Observations 731 731 731 731
R-squared 0.150 0.143 0.102 0.112
Status 12 Months after CSS Status 18 Months after CSS 
Notes: Analysis extended designation files for 2010 and 2011 CSS samples. Linear probability model estimated using OLS.  
Specifications also include indicators for  CSS cohort and province.  Sampling weights are used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C1: Repayment Problems at CSS by Income and Additional Financial Resources (Includes Living with Parents)
Has Both Savings  
and Family 
Assistance
 Has Either Savings or 
Family Assistance 
(Not Both)
Has Neither Savings 
nor Family 
Assistance
A: Any repayment Problem
Income < $20,000 0.130 0.497 0.785
(0.040) (0.064) (0.072)
16.93% 28.65% 5.12%
Income ≥ $20,000 0.055 0.108 0.571
(0.021) (0.032) (0.130)
28.99% 16.01% 4.29%
B: Serious Repayment Problem
Income < $20,000 0.048 0.181 0.367
(0.023) (0.042) (0.083)
16.93% 28.65% 5.12%
Income ≥ $20,000 0.016 0.060 0.141
(0.010) (0.026) (0.060)
28.99% 16.01% 4.29%
Note: Repayment problem indicator means by income and additional resource measures.  'Savings' 
implies savings ≥ $1,000.  'Family Assistance' implies at least one of the following: (i) expected family 
transfers of at least $2,500, (ii) can move in with parents, or (iii) already living with parents. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. (Weighted) percent of population in each cell is in italics.  Sampling weights 
are used.
Variables
Any Repayment 
Problem
Serious 
Repayment 
Problem
has either savings or parental help (not both) -0.201 -0.131
(0.076) (0.092)
has both savings and parental help -0.590 -0.269
(0.077) (0.093)
current annual income < $10,000 0.149 0.0012
(0.072) (0.058)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 0.251 0.103
(0.077) (0.059)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared -0.020 -0.014
(0.013) (0.011)
vocational/technical school graduate or more -0.047 -0.087
(0.095) (0.079)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree 0.165 0.008
(0.091) (0.058)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.052 -0.082
(0.076) (0.047)
male -0.031 -0.078
(0.075) (0.052)
age -0.009 -0.003
(0.019) (0.017)
aboriginal 0.044 0.105
(0.141) (0.108)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.109 0.063
(0.074) (0.072)
constant 0.738 0.391
(0.438) (0.437)
Observations 338 338
R-squared 0.374 0.147
Note: Sample includes respondents with income less than $20,000 per year 'Savings' implies savings ≥ 
$1,000.  'Family Assistance' implies at least one of the following: (i) expected family transfers of at 
least $2,500, (ii) can move in with parents, or (iii) already living with parents. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Sampling weights are used.
Table C2: The Effect of Savings and Parental Assistance (Includes Living with Parents) on 
Repayment Problems for Low-Income Borrowers
Table C3: Effects of Income and Other Characteristics on Repayment Problems for Different Levels of Additional Resources (Includes Living with Parents)
Variables
Has Both 
Savings  and 
Family 
Assistance
 Has Either 
Savings or 
Family 
Assistance 
(Not Both)
Has Neither 
Savings nor 
Family 
Assistance
Has Both 
Savings  and 
Family 
Assistance
 Has Either 
Savings or 
Family 
Assistance 
(Not Both)
Has Neither 
Savings nor 
Family 
Assistance
current monthly income < $20,000/yr 0.149 0.522 0.757 0.048 0.114 0.217
(0.068) (0.105) (0.201) (0.048) (0.062) (0.222)
current monthly income $20,000 to at least 40,000/yr 0.069 0.052 0.462 -0.005 0.042 0.084
(0.053) (0.094) (0.216) (0.033) (0.061) (0.207)
CSLP loan amount outstanding at consolidation (in $10,000) 0.013 0.183 0.218 -0.031 0.079 0.202
(0.045) (0.092) (0.146) (0.023) (0.070) (0.150)
CSLP loan amount (in $10,000) squared 0.009 -0.017 -0.047 0.010 -0.015 -0.029
(0.011) (0.015) (0.032) (0.008) (0.011) (0.024)
vocational/technical school graduate or more -0.034 -0.062 0.053 -0.054 -0.016 -0.180
(0.086) (0.126) (0.142) (0.038) (0.100) (0.175)
4-year university graduate or post-graduate degree -0.013 0.101 0.164 0.005 0.009 0.110
(0.068) (0.096) (0.176) (0.024) (0.065) (0.164)
would stop paying CSLP loan first if unable to repay all loans 0.022 0.108 -0.155 0.031 -0.077 -0.114
(0.042) (0.088) (0.113) (0.027) (0.051) (0.136)
male 0.016 0.075 0.238 -0.012 -0.011 0.035
(0.054) (0.082) (0.170) (0.025) (0.055) (0.154)
age 0.012 -0.010 0.006 0.011 -0.008 -0.024
(0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.006) (0.016) (0.027)
aboriginal -0.085 0.041 0.144 -0.032 0.109 -0.042
(0.049) (0.184) (0.090) (0.035) (0.106) (0.144)
private for profit post-secondary institution (CSS loan type) 0.014 0.122 -0.007 0.040 0.066 0.293
(0.057) (0.081) (0.143) (0.039) (0.072) (0.133)
Constant -0.335 0.061 -0.305 -0.233 0.109 0.651
(0.239) (0.427) (0.572) (0.123) (0.362) (0.678)
Observations 221 305 110 221 305 110
R-squared 0.109 0.271 0.445 0.078 0.095 0.262
Any Repayment Problem Serious Repayment Problem
Note: 'Savings' implies savings ≥ $1,000.  'Family Assistance' implies at least one of the following: (i) expected family transfers of at least $2,500, (ii) can 
move in with parents, or (iii) already living with parents.  Standard errors are in parantheses. Sampling weights are used. 
